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Abstract
Parallel trade (PT) is a practice related to arbitrage opera‐
tions in international trade. We provide a rationale for PT
as an opportunistic behaviour by an international whole‐
saler who is privately informed about market demands in
two countries where a multinational firm operates. This
alternative theory of PT contributes to an explanation of
why PT has gained considerable importance in various
industries, and why it has not yet resulted in price conver‐
gence across relevant countries. Indeed, we find that
asymmetric information enlarges the scope for PT, relative
to complete information, and possibly increases cross-
country differences in prices. The European Commission
supports PT as a means to achieve the integration of
national markets, to the benefit of all citizens. However,
under asymmetric information, consumers benefit from PT
only with a high volume of parallel imports (e.g., when
arbitrage costs are low); otherwise competition among
wholesalers can be an effective substitute for PT. Further‐
more, an important implication of PT is the transfer of
profits from the manufacturer to the wholesaler. Therefore,
in R&D-intensive industries, such as pharmaceuticals,
policy makers should anticipate the likely consequences of
PT under asymmetric information on the long-run incen‐
tives to innovate.
Keywords Parallel trade, vertical control, asymmetric
information
1. Introduction
Parallel trade (PT) is a practice related to arbitrage opera‐
tions in international trade. It consists in importing goods
into a country without the authorization of the intellectual
property rights (IPR) owner, after those goods have been
produced and distributed legally in another market by the
rights-holder, or an authorized distributor.
The legitimacy of PT in a given area depends upon the
policy makers’ decision concerning the regime of territorial
exhaustion of IPR. For instance, the EU has adopted a
regime of regional exhaustion where IPR are ended upon
first sale in Member States (thus allowing free trade among
them), but still hold outside the region. Thus, the EU
supports PT as a means to achieve the integration of
national markets, to the benefit of all citizens. On the other
hand, United States have chosen national exhaustion,
where IPR owners may prevent imports. Generally,
developing countries have chosen international exhaus‐
tion, with complete trade liberalization.
The main reason for PT is the existence of price differen‐
tials across countries. These in turn have been explained in
terms of retail price discrimination [1, 2], vertical pricing [3,
4], or national differences in government price controls [5, 6].
In this paper, we provide a complementary explanation for
PT, which is based on asymmetric information about
market demand between upstream manufacturers and
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wholesalers or distributors. This alternative theory of PT
may contribute to explain why PT has gained considerable
importance in various industries, and why it has not yet
resulted in price convergence across relevant countries.
Empirical evidence shows that PT plays a significant role
in a number of industries. In pharmaceuticals, PT in the EU
was estimated to amount to € 5,465 million at ex-factory
prices in 2012 [7]. In the UK, the market share of PT is 9%,
while, in Germany, it is 10.2%. In the Netherlands, parallel
imports have reached about 15% of the ethical-drug
market, and concern nine out of the top ten firms.
Table 1 displays the time trend of market shares attributa‐
ble to PT in some relevant destination markets in the EU.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Denmark 15,2 16,5 20 24,3 23,8 23
Germany 8,9 9 10,9 11,8 10,1 10,2
The Netherlands 10,9 12 10 10 13,5 14,8
Norway 4,3 4,4 2,1 12,7 2,6 3,6
Sweden 13,9 15,5 10,2 10,7 14,8 18,9
UK 12,4 11,7 14 7 7,8 9
Table 1. Market shares (%) of PT (source: [7])
The motivating example for our model concerns Bayer
group, a major multinational firm in the pharmaceutical
industry. In particular, it regards Adalat, a drug designed
to treat cardiovascular illness that, in a few years after the
launch, reached around 8% of the relevant EU market [8].
Adalat provides a clear example of how the same prescrip‐
tion drug manufactured in different countries by the same
multinational firm can be affected by PT due to price
differentials between countries. Actually, prices in Spain
and France were initially, on average, 40% lower than
prices in the UK. Because of these price differentials,
wholesalers in Spain and France exported Adalat to the UK.
Adalat represents a large percentage of total turnover of
Bayer UK, figures such as 56% having been quoted in the
past years. On account of parallel imports, sales of Adalat
by Bayer UK fell by almost half in a few years, thereby
causing a loss of revenue of 160 million US dollars for the
British subsidiary and a loss of 70 million US dollars to
Bayer group as a whole [8]. Figure 1 provides a stylized
representation of how PT works in this example, where
‘Market A’ is Spain or France, and ‘Market B’ is the UK.
The main problem manufacturers have regarding the
limitation of exports is that, as soon as they have sold their
products to the wholesalers, they have no further direct
control over the product final destination. In many indus‐
tries (such as pharmaceuticals), the reciprocal flows of
orders and deliveries between wholesalers and retailers
enable wholesalers to have a precise knowledge of local
markets and forecast demand sizes more thoroughly than
manufacturers. Hence, to gather information about market
demand and possibly reduce the scope for arbitrage,
manufacturing firms may set up monitoring systems on
distribution channels.
Indeed, faced with PT, Bayer decided that the subsidiaries
in Spain and France would no longer fulfil all orders placed
by wholesalers in their respective countries. In addition,
Bayer set up a monitoring system based on the recording
of supplies in a given period (reference quantity). Then, on a
yearly basis, Bayer decided unilaterally the quantity
amount to be sold to each wholesaler. In so doing, Bayer
stopped responding to orders for supplies from certain
wholesalers identified by the system as those who had
increased their orders by inordinate proportions over the
past years. The aim behind this practice was to target the
main export suppliers in order to reduce the volumes of
product channelled into the parallel import market.1
Similarly, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) also introduced an
agency distribution scheme in the UK, in an attempt to gain
more control over the distribution of its products. As part
of the agreement, each wholesaler had to supply GSK with
detailed sales data on the destination and volumes of some
GSK’s products sold. This ‘transparency obligation’ was
primarily intended to curtail PT. Following the same line,
Pfizer and other multinational firms later introduced
similar agency models in the UK [9].
The central argument of this paper claims that the scope for
PT is related to the wholesalers having private information
about consumer demand in national markets. Thus, we
model strategic interaction by defining a game where a
multinational firm offers a menu of contracts to a privately
informed international wholesaler in order to infer its type
(that is associated with market sizes) and, possibly, limit
PT. On the other hand, the wholesaler aims at obtaining
product quantities larger than the actual demand in the
low-price market, and lower than the actual demand in the
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Figure 1. The working mechanism of PT
1 The European Court of Justice has sentenced in favour of quantity restrictions imposed by Bayer on Spanish and French distributors of Adalat, thereby
reversing the initial Commission Decision (see [8]). Interestingly, while the monitoring system allowed Bayer to identify those wholesalers that had parallel
exported Adalat, supply restrictions did not alter the attitude of international agents, which reacted to such restrictions by spreading their orders through a
number of small local wholesalers. In so doing, they were able to maintain a significant level of PT.
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high-price market, so as to rearrange the quantities sold at
its own benefit.
We find that asymmetric information enlarges the scope for
PT compared with the case of complete information, since
PT becomes profitable for substantially lower intermediate
price differentials. We show that one of the main implica‐
tions of PT is transferring profits from the manufacturer to
the wholesaler. On the other hand, consumers really take
advantage of PT only in the presence of a high volume of
parallel imports (e.g. when arbitrage costs are low),
otherwise competition among wholesalers can be an
effective substitute for PT.2
The relevant literature rules out the typical problems
arising from a principal-agent context with a privately
informed wholesaler. To our knowledge, all of the relevant
papers assume that the manufacturer is completely
informed. Therefore, the manufacturer is able, first, to
perfectly control the quantities sold in each country (thus
governing the extent of PT) and, second, to extract the
wholesaler’s profit.
Country
No. of
wholesalers
(approx.)
No. of
dominant
companies
Market share
of dominant
companies
Number of
leading
parallel
importers
Austria 9 3 81%
Belgium 23 3 65%
Denmark 3 2 95% 2
Finland 2 2 99%
France 11 3 94%
Germany 16 4 "/>75% 4
Greece 147 7 33%
Ireland 3 3 90%
Italy 200 81 89%
Luxembourg 4 3 80%
Netherlands 4 5 86% 2
Portugal 130 2 40%
Spain 100 3 38%
Sweden 2 2 96% 2
UK 11 3 91% 6
Table 2. National market shares for the major distribution firms (Source:
authors’ elaboration from [10, 11])
This assumption seems to be at odds with the trend towards
concentration and internationalisation in wholesaling and
distribution, which has produced pan-European chains. In
the past years, the three biggest wholesalers in Europe
(Phoenix, Celesio and Alliance UniChem) have acquired
smaller firms locally and across national borders, and now
are dominant firms in several EU markets. Indeed, their
combined shares reached, in 2007, 100% in Denmark and
Norway, 92% in the UK, 70% in France, and 63% in
Germany [10, 11]. Table 2 shows the high degree of
concentration in distribution in a number of national EU
markets.
This trend towards concentration in the distribution
segment, producing pan-European chains, improves
wholesalers’ and distributors’ bargaining position in front
of manufacturers. This bargaining power is strengthened
by the fact that wholesalers and distributors are often better
informed on actual market demands than upstream
producers are.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section
2 defines the theoretical model and identifies the agents’
strategies. Section 3 analyses the effect of competition in the
distribution segment. Section 4 analyses welfare implica‐
tions, while Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2. The model
We analyse formally the scope for PT in a vertical relation‐
ship between a multinational manufacturer and an inter‐
national wholesaler. For this purpose, we assume that the
manufacturer (M) has two plants producing the same good
located in two different countries (A and B), and that the
wholesaler (W) deals with the sales of the good in both retail
markets. Let the inverse demand curves take the linear
form. For simplicity, we assume that in each country the
manufacturer has zero marginal costs, while the only cost
incurred by the wholesaler is that of purchasing the good
at the intermediate price.
The information structure is such that the wholesaler has
private information about market sizes, as measured by the
demand intercept parameters aA, aB in markets A and B
respectively. However, it is common knowledge that
demand in each country may be high (so that aA=HA and/or
aB=HB) or low (so that aA=LA and/or aB=LB), where
LA<HA<LB<HB. The manufacturer’s prior beliefs about the
sizes of the two markets can be expressed according to a
probability distribution Pij, with Pij≥ 0 ∀i, j∈{H, L} and
ΣijPij= 1 (where subscript i refers to the size of market A and
subscript j to the size of market B), which is also common
knowledge. Let the four possible market configurations be
assimilated to the wholesaler’s types ij, ∀i, j∈{H, L}.
In this framework, we model strategic interaction between
the manufacturer and the wholesaler through the following
two-stage game. At the first stage of the game, the manu‐
facturer offers a menu of contracts to the wholesaler. At the
second stage of the game, the wholesaler makes a selection
from the menu that is observed by the multinational. Each
contract in the menu specifies the quantity amount to be
purchased by each wholesaler’s type in each country, and
2 Our model focuses on the static efficiency of PT. Nonetheless, PT also influences dynamic efficiency, by affecting R&D firms’ long run incentives to innovate
(see the discussion in the concluding section, and the references reported therein).
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the related intermediate prices. On the basis of the whole‐
saler’s choice, the manufacturer updates its prior beliefs
about the sizes of the two markets.
The manufacturer may be interested in discerning the
wholesaler’s type (that is, market sizes) and, consequently,
limit the extent of PT. The menu approach allows the
proposed contract to be conditional on the wholesaler’s
type. Hence, to induce self-selection, the menu of contracts
should properly take into account the constraints arising
from incentive compatibility and participation. If the menu
induces separation, the manufacturer correctly infers the
wholesaler’s type. In the opposite case, the posterior beliefs
are the same as the priors.
2.1 Complete information – segmented markets
In this section, we consider the benchmark case for our
results. First, we assume that there is complete information.
Thus, both the manufacturer and the wholesaler are
perfectly aware of the actual market sizes. Moreover, we
assume that markets are segmented, namely, PT is not
allowed legally. Clearly, this is the most profitable case to
the manufacturer under complete information.
Let pA =aA−bqA and pB =aB −bqB be the inverse demand
curves, where pA, pB are the retail prices and qA, qB are the
quantities sold in the two markets. Let wA, wB denote the
intermediate prices of the good in countries A and B,
respectively. Under market segmentation, the wholesaler’s
optimal strategy is determined by solving:
,
max [( ) ] [( ) ]
A B
W A A A A A B B B B Bq q a bq q w q a bq q w qP = - - + - -
Thus, the wholesaler chooses the quantities to be sold in
each market (that are respectively equal to those purchased
from each of the manufacturer’s plants) so that the joint
profit is maximized. On the other hand, the manufacturer’s
optimal strategy is determined by solving:
,
max
A B
M A A B Bw w w q w qP = +
Thus, the multinational firm chooses the intermediate
prices that maximize the joint profit, thereby practicing
third-degree price discrimination. The optimal intermedi‐
ate prices and (both intermediate and final) quantities can
be easily derived, and are as follows:
( )
( )
2; 2;
2 4 ;
2 4
      
  
A A B B
A A A A
B B B B
w a w a
q a w b a b
q a w b a b
= =
= - =
= - =
(1)
The results obtained directly extend to the case of two
markets the classical double-marginalization model,
involving two vertically-related monopolies.
In what follows, we will refer to this benchmark case as the
‘segmented market’ (SM) case. The focus of our paper is in
fact on PT specifically deriving from the assumed informa‐
tion structure of the game, that is, from the wholesaler
having private information about market demands. This
structure may provide a rationale for PT as an opportunistic
behaviour by the wholesaler, in the sense that it has the
possibility to purchase quantities that differ from those it
resells in the retail markets. In particular, the wholesaler
may find it profitable to modify the required quantities in
such a way that is functional to international arbitrage.
Thus, the wholesaler would like to induce the manufactur‐
er to produce quantities in excess with respect to the real
low-price market size, on the one side, and less than the real
high-price market size, on the other side. Therefore, the
manufacturer is not able to identify a simple direct rela‐
tionship between the quantities purchased upstream, those
resold downstream and the actual market sizes. In the next
sections, we will focus on the case where, due to the
intermediate price differential, PT reduces the multination‐
al firm’s joint profit.
2.2 Incomplete information – parallel trade
Now, assume that PT is not legally restricted. Let s be the
unit cost of transporting the good from country A to B
(including not merely the cost of physical transportation,
but also repackaging and other possible distribution costs).
Let δ denote the transported quantity. It follows from the
assumption on market sizes that PT can only flow from
country A to B. For simplicity, we assume that the whole‐
saler cannot create inventories nor can it buys quantities of
the good that it does not resell. This implies that the sum of
the purchased quantities from M coincide with the total
quantities sold by W in the two countries.
Under asymmetric information, the manufacturer may
wish to infer market sizes from the wholesaler’s purchased
quantities. As a response to the chance of PT, the manufac‐
turer may decide to restrict the quantities it sells to the
wholesaler to a discrete and finite set, including exactly the
quantities the wholesaler would ask in the segmented
market case. In other words, the manufacturer may offer
the wholesaler a menu of contracts, where quantities and
wholesale prices are specified as in (1). To simplify the
analysis, in the remainder of the paper we assume that this
is actually the case. We can prove that, under certain
conditions, selecting this menu of contracts is the manu‐
facturer’s equilibrium strategy under incomplete informa‐
tion.
Let t={ tij }, i, j∈ {H , L }, represent a contract menu, where
ij denotes the wholesaler’s type. Each contract in the menu
consists of a pair of quantities (qA, qB)ij and the associated
intermediate (linear) prices (wA, wB)ij, that is,
tij = (qA, qB)ij, (wA, wB)ij , i, j∈ {H , L }. Following the above
discussion, the manufacturer supplies a set of quantities
that coincide with the optimal quantities produced and
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sold in the segmented market case, as a function of the
actual market sizes:
( )
( )
( )
( )
, ,2 2
, ,2 2
, ,2 2
, ,2 2
A A B B
A B LL
A A B B
A B LH
A A B B
A B HL
A A B B
A B HH
L w L wq q b b
L w H wq q b b
H w L wq q b b
H w H wq q b b
- -æ ö= ç ÷è ø
- -æ ö= ç ÷è ø
- -æ ö= ç ÷è ø
- -æ ö= ç ÷è ø
(2)
Now, let Π ij(thk )=Πhkij  denote the payoff to the wholesaler’s
type ij that chooses the specific contract for type hk, for
i, j,  h , k ∈ {H , L }. Let Π ij(tij)=Π ij be the payoff to type ij in
the case where it chooses its specific contract. A menu
t={ tij } is called a separation-inducing menu if, for hk ≠ ij, it
satisfies the following conditions:
ij ij
hkP ³ P (3)
0ijP ³ (4)
for i, j,  h , k ∈ {H , L }.
Condition (3) is the self-selection constraint, while condi‐
tion (4) is the participation constraint. If the menu induces
separation, both players act as if they have complete
information in the second-stage of the game. This happens
when, for each possible demand configuration, W chooses
the related contract, thus adopting a separating strategy. In
the opposite case, a specific contract is selected by a
multiplicity of types. When the same contract is profitable
to all the wholesaler’s types, irrespective of the actual
demand levels, W is said to adopt a pooling strategy. Hence,
M cannot infer the real market sizes, so that it supplies
quantities of the good different from those it would have
supplied under complete information. In the case where W
adopts a pooling strategy for a subset of configurations, and
a separating strategy for the remaining subset, W is playing
a hybrid strategy (i.e., a partially-pooling or a semi-
separating strategy). Figure 2 displays the wholesaler’s
strategies, on the basis of market sizes.
The appropriate solution concept for this game is the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). The definition of a PBE
consists of a set of strategies and beliefs such that, at each
stage of the game, strategies are optimal given beliefs, and
the beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategies and
observed actions using Bayes’ rule (see [12]). A PBE of the
described game is separating if the wholesaler adopts a
separating strategy, while it is pooling (partially-pooling) if
the wholesaler adopts a pooling (partially-pooling)
strategy.
 
Figure 2. Wholesaler’s strategy definition 
2.3. Equilibrium analysis 
In the described framework, it is of primary interest to us to analyse PT as deriving from the existence of partially-
pooling equilibria of the game. These equilibria result from the profitability to any wholesaler’s type ij to mimic any 
other type hk in the choice of a specific contract from the menu. Given the discrete and finite set of proposed contracts, 
the number of possible partially-pooling equilibria is also finite. 
Table 3 displays the imitation strategies (on the table columns) that are available to each wholesaler’s type (on the rows), 
where + (respectively, -) indicates that the imitation strategy may be profitable (is unprofitable). 
 HH HL LH LL 
HH  + - - 
HL -  - - 
LH + +  + 
LL - - -  
Table 3. Imitation strategies 
Clearly, the profitability of any imitation strategy depends on arbitrage costs. Nonetheless, a number of imitation 
strategies are in sharp contrast with the assumed direction of arbitrage flow. Actually, to be effectively able to engage in 
PT, the wholesaler should purchase in country A a quantity amount in excess relative to the actual market size. This, in 
turn, implies that a number of possible pooling strategies are indeed prevented from occurring. 
On the basis of the foregoing statements, the most interesting case for the analysis occurs when type LH mimics type HL. 
Actually, this represents the partially-pooling strategy that maximizes the scope for PT, in the sense that the transported 
quantity amount is the highest possible. Therefore, it is potentially the imitation strategy with the most significant 
impact on firms’ profits and consumer surplus. For these reasons, in the remainder of the paper, we will focus on this 
case. To keep things interesting, let us make the following assumption. 
Dummy Text Assumption 1. The manufacturer’s profit when the wholesaler selects from the menu the contract for type 
HL is lower than the profit when the selected contract is the one for type LH, that is, the condition ( )2 28 8A BH b L b+ ≤
( )2 28 8A BL b H b+  holds. 
HA,HB
HA,LB
LA,HB
LA,LB
partially pooling
separating
HA,HB
HA,LB
LA,HB
LA,LB
t
HL
t
HH
pooling
t
HL
t
LH
tLL
tHH
t
HL
t
LL
Figure 2. Wholesaler’s strategy definition
2.3 Equilibrium analysis
In the described fr mework, it is of primary interest to us
to analyse PT as deriving from the existence of partially-
pooling equilibria of the game. These equilibria result from
the profitability to any wholesaler’s type ij to mimic any
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Clearly, the profitability of any imitation strategy depends
on arbitrage costs. Nonetheless, a number of imitation
strategies are in sharp contrast with the assumed direction
of arbitrage flow. Actually, to be effectively able to engage
in PT, the wholesaler should purchase in country A a
quantity amount in excess relative to the actual market size.
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This, in turn, implies that a number of possible pooling
strategies are indeed prevented from occurring.
On the basis of the foregoing statements, the most interest‐
ing case for the analysis occurs when type LH mimics type
HL. Actually, this represents the partially-pooling strategy
that maximizes the scope for PT, in the sense that the
transported quantity amount is the highest possible.
Therefore, it is potentially the imitation strategy with the
most significant impact on firms’ profits and consumer
surplus. For these reasons, in the remainder of the paper,
we will focus on this case. To keep things interesting, let us
make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The manufacturer’s profit when the wholesaler
selects from the menu the contract for type HL is lower than the
profit when the selected contract is the one for type LH, that is,
the condition (HA2 / 8b + L B2 / 8b)≤ (L A2 / 8b + HB2 / 8b) holds.
It follows from Assumption 1 that, in the considered case,
PT has detrimental effects on the manufacturer’s profit. Let
us now determine the precise quantity amount that is
functional to international arbitrage.
Proposition 1.If a partially-pooling equilibrium of the game
exists where type LH mimics type HL, the quantity that the
wholesaler imports in market B from market A is:
1
4 2
A B
MAX B A
H LH L sbd
-æ ö= - + -ç ÷è ø (5)
Proof. The incentive compatibility constraint for type LH to
mimic type HL can be written as:
ΠHLLH −Π LH = L A−b( HA4b −δ) ( HA4b −δ)
+ HB −b( L B4b + δ) ( L B4b + δ)
− HA2 ( HA4b ) + L B2 ( L B4b ) + δ ⋅ s − 116b (L A2 + HB2)≥0
 Note that
ΠHLLH −Π LH  is a quadratic function that is concave in δ. It
follows that ΠHLLH −Π LH ≥0∀δ∈ δ ′, δ ″ , where δ ′ and δ ″ are
the roots of the quadratic. Moreover, there is only one value
of δ∈ δ ′, δ ″  that maximizes the difference ΠHLLH −Π LH .
Simple computations allow us to derive that such value is
δMAX = 14b (HB − L A + HA− L B2 − s). QED
When the wholesaler’s type LH imitates type HL, the
manufacturer cannot discriminate between the two types.
Hence, it sells as if demand in country A is high whereas it
is low, and as if demand in country B is low whereas it is
high, thus losing (under Assumption 1) part of the profit it
would have obtained in the segmented market case.
Computation yields that the following result holds.
Proposition 2. There is a partially-pooling equilibrium
where type LH mimics type HL if the transport cost is
sufficiently low, that is, if:
)( ) ( )( )( )(
1 2 2
1 2 3 32
B A
B A
A A A A B B B B
L Hs s H L
H L H L H L H L
æ ö æ ö£ = - + -ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è ø
- - - + - -
(6)
An interesting remark should be made at this point. Under
complete information, the necessary condition for PT to be
profitable is clearly wA + s <wB. Under incomplete informa‐
tion, the value of δMAX  can be rewritten as an explicit
function of the intermediate prices wA = HA / 2 and
wB = L B / 2. By substituting these values into the expression
of δMAX , it can be obtained that:
δMAX = 14b ((HB − L B) + (HA− L A) + wB −wA− s).
As expected, the transported quantity is directly propor‐
tional to the intermediate price differential between the two
countries (including the cost of arbitrage). However, an
additional impact on the transported quantity emerges that
can be uniquely attributed to the presence of asymmetric
information, namely, the term ((HB − L B) + (HA− L A)). This
term identifies the scope for PT as a function of the differ‐
ence between the real market sizes (respectively, L A and
HB) and the signalled dimensions, namely, the quantities
purchased through the selected contract (respectively, HA
and L B). The wholesaler’s strategy enables it to incur lower
intermediate costs compared to complete information, and
to recoup arbitrage costs by setting proper retail prices.
Indeed, much of the quantity purchased by W in country
A at a cost wA <wB is resold in B at a price pB > pA.
The main implication is that, under incomplete informa‐
tion, PT may persist in the case where the transport cost is
higher than the intermediate price differential (to the
extreme case, even setting equal intermediate prices could
not be enough to deter PT).
Let us now examine the effect of PT on both ex-factory and
retail price differentials. Under market segmentation, when
actual market sizes are those related to type LH, the ex-
factory price differential can be expressed as:
Δ SM (w)=wB −wA =(HB − L A) / 2. In the case of a partially-
pooling equilibrium where type LH mimics type HL, the
manufacturer cannot discriminate, so that it sets prices as
if the actual market sizes were HL. As a consequence, the
intermediate price differential with PT can be expressed as:
Δ PT (w)=wB −wA =(L B −HA) / 2. It is easy to see that, under
the assumption L B > HA, the intermediate price differential
is positive and the following condition holds:
Δ PT (w)−Δ SM (w)<0. This proves that the ex-factory price
differential is reduced (although not completely eliminat‐
ed) by PT.
As regards retail prices, these can be written as a function
of the quantity imported in B from A, that is,
pA = L A−b(HA / 4b−δMAX ) and pB = HB −b(L B / 4b + δMAX ). By
using the expression of δMAX  from Proposition 1, we can
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easily obtain: Δ PT (p)−Δ SM (p)= s / 2− (HB − L A) / 4. It directly
follows that: Δ PT (p)−Δ SM (p)<0⇔ s <(HB − L A) / 2. It is
worth noting that this critical value may be higher or lower
than the critical value for PT to be profitable (i.e. s = s1). It
follows that PT in some cases reduces, but in some cases
raises the retail price differential.
The foregoing statements can be summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.PT reduces the intermediate price differential
between countries. On the other hand, PT may reduce or even
increase the cross-country retail price differential.
3. Downstream competition
Let us now assume that there are n symmetric international
wholesalers for the homogenous good produced by M. The
linear inverse demand curve in country m can be written
as: pm =am−b∑l=1
n qlm =am−nbqlm, m= A,B, where pm denotes the
retail price in country m and qlm denotes the quantity sold
by wholesaler l (l= 1,...n) in country m. As a benchmark, let
us briefly examine the segmented market case. The
problem of each wholesaler can be written as:
( ) ( )
,
max
1,..., 
lA lB
Wl A lA lA A lA B lB lB B lBq q a nbq q w q a nbq q w q
l n
P = - - + - -
" =
On the other hand, the manufacturer’s problem is:
max , , .
m
M m m lm m lmw l
w q Bq Anw mP = ==å
We can easily find that:
( )2
2; ; .( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
m mSM SM SMm m m m
lm m m lm
a wa w a wq p wb n n b n
-- -= = + P =+ + +
Note that the optimal intermediate prices are independent
of the number of wholesalers: wmSM =am / 2, m= A, B.
If the n wholesalers operating in both markets have private
information about market sizes, the manufacturer proposes
a contract menu where the supplied quantities are deter‐
mined on the basis of the number of competing wholesal‐
ers, while intermediate prices, being independent of their
number, are not affected. The possible PBE of the game are
the same as those discussed in subsection 2.3, in the sense
that there are partially-pooling and separating equilibria.
Let us focus on the partially-pooling equilibrium where
type LH imitates type HL.
Proposition 4.If a partially-pooling equilibrium of the game
exists where type LH mimics type HL, the quantity that each
wholesaler imports in market B from market A is:
( )14 ( 1)l B A A B
nH L H L sbn nd
æ ö= - + - -ç ÷+è ø (7)
Proof. We omit the proof, since it follows the same steps as
the proof of Proposition 1. QED
Downstream competition reduces the scope for PT to each
single wholesaler. This effect can be explained on the
following grounds. First, there is a fall in each wholesaler’s
margin, due to the reduction of retail prices, while inter‐
mediate prices are not affected by competition. Second,
there is also a fall in the amount of quantities that each
wholesaler can distribute. A further implication is that the
transported quantity from market A to B in the case of a
single wholesaler is higher than the overall transported
quantity with n competing wholesalers.
Proposition 5.Ceteris paribus, downstream competition reduces
the scope for PT.
Proof. The total transported quantity in an environment
with n symmetric competing wholesalers is simply given
by the sum of the δl  transported by each wholesaler l:
( )1 .4 ( 1)n l B A A Bl
nH L H L sb nd d
æ ö= = - + - -ç ÷+è øå
It is easy to see that:
( )1 1 0,4 1 2n MAX A B
n H Lb nd d
æ ö- = - - <ç ÷+è ø
being n / (n + 1)>1 / 2∀n ≥2. QED
Similar to the case of a single wholesaler, we can find the
following result.
Proposition 6. There is a partially-pooling equilibrium where
type LH mimics type HL if:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2
1
1 2 2 1 22
1 1 2
n B A A B
A A A A
B B B B
ns s H L H Ln
n H n H L Ln
n H L H n L
£ = - + -+
+ - + +- + + + - +
(8)
Easy computation yields that sn < s1 holds for n >1.
4. Welfare implications
We evaluate here the effects of PT on both upstream and
downstream firms’ profits, as well as on consumer surplus
in the considered countries. Note that we assess welfare
implications of PT only in terms of static efficiency, namely,
the real resources used in arbitrage are weighted against
the involved parties’ costs and benefits.
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First, we compare the amount of consumer surplus under
PT, that is, CSnPT = 12 (∑l=1n qlAPT )2 + 12 (∑l=1n qlBPT )2, and in the
segmented market case, that is,
CSnSM = 12 (∑l=1n qlASM )2 + 12 (∑l=1n qlBSM )2. We analyse the results as a
function of the degree of competition in the downstream
segment and the cost of international arbitrage. In this
framework, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 7.Compared with the segmented market case, the
following cases are possible:
a. if transport costs are relatively low, the combined effect of
PT and downstream competition raises consumer surplus;
that is, if s ≤min{sn, s '} then CSnPT −CSnSM > 0∀ n, where
s ' = HB − L A− n1 + n 2(HB2 + L A2) − (HA + L B)2 ;
b. if transport costs are high, PT reduces consumer surplus
when downstream competition is sufficiently intense; that
is, there exists a critical value n^ such that, if s ' < s < sn, then
CSnPT −CSnSM < 0∀ n > n^.
Proof. We can find that CSnPT −CSnSM  is a quadratic function
in s:
( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )
2
2 22 2 2
2
16 8
1 2 2 1
16 1
B APT SM
n n
A B B A B A
s H LsCS CS b b
n H L n n H L n H L
b n
-- = - -
+ - + - - + - +
+
Solving CSnPT −CSnSM =0 with respect to s yields two roots:
s ' = HB − L A− n1 + n 2(HB2 + L A2)− (HA + L B)2 and
s ' ' = HB − L A + n1 + n 2(HB2 + L A2)− (HA + L B)2. Since s ' ' > sn
then s ' ' must be discarded because PT is not profitable.
Computation yields that ∂
2 (CSnPT −CSnSM )
∂s 2 =
1
8b >0. Hence,
we have that CSnPT −CSnSM >0 holds if s <min{sn, s '}.
Let us now compare sn and s '. Computation yields that:
i. lim
n→0+
sn = limn→0+s ' = HB − L A ;
ii. lim
n→0+
∂sn
∂n = −∞ ;
iii. ∂s '
∂n <0 ;
iv. lim
n→0+
∂s '
∂n = − 2(HB2 + L A2)− (HA + L B)2 <0.
Solving sn = s ' in n yields two roots: n =0 and
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2
1
22 2 2 2 2
22 2
ˆ
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
A A B B
B A A A A B B A A B
B B B B A A B
n n
H L H L
H L H H L L H L H L
L L H H L H L
-
= =
- + - ´
æ ö+ - + × - + + - +ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷- - + + - +ç ÷è ø
We can find that i), ii), iii) and iv) imply that n^ >0 and that
sn crosses s ' from below in n^. It follows that s ' < sn holds for
n > n^. This proves that, if n > n^ and s ' < s < sn, then
CSnPT −CSnSM <0. QED
Figure 3 shows the effects of PT on total wholesalers’ profit
(ΠWPT −ΠWSM =∑l=1
n ΠWlPT −∑l=1
n ΠWlSM ) and on aggregate consumer
surplus (CSnPT −CSnSM ), as a function of the number of
wholesalers (n) and of the transport cost (s), for given
values of demand parameters (i.e., LA=20, HA=39, LB=40,
HB=56). Given the basic parameter values, Figure 3 displays
three critical values of the transport cost, respectively, sn,
s’, and s’’.
From Proposition 6, the critical value sn identifies the
maximum value of s for which the partially-pooling
equilibrium exists, that is, for which PT is profitable. From
Proposition 7, we have that, when s<s’, CSnPT −CSnSM  is
positive, that is, consumers benefit from PT. Finally, we
find the critical value s’’ by imposing condition
CSnPT −CSnSM =ΠWPT −ΠWSM , and solving with respect to s. In
Figure 3, we can identify three different areas (respectively
denoted as 1, 2, and 3) under the curve drawn by sn, which
are delimited by the curves drawn by s’ and s’’.
Figure 3 shows that consumers as a whole really benefit
from PT only in the presence of a high volume of parallel
imports. Recall, from Proposition 5, that downstream
competition reduces the scope for PT. Thus, the volume of
parallel imports is sufficiently high in two alternative
circumstances (see Figure 3): i) given that downstream
competition is intense (n > n^ ≈3), if the transport cost is
sufficiently low (s<s’), namely, in the relevant portion of
area (2); ii) with a small number of wholesalers (n ≤ n^), for
any feasible value of the transport cost (s<sn), namely, in the
remaining portion of area (2) and in area (1).
Conversely, in area (3), the volume of parallel imports is
relatively small, since the transport cost is high (s’<s<sn) and
the number of wholesalers is high (n > n^). Consequently, we
find that CSnPT −CSnSM  is negative, that is, PT reduces
consumer surplus.
Finally, we are able to assess how wholesalers and con‐
sumers share the benefits of PT, if any. In area (1), where
the transport cost is sufficiently high (s’’<s<sn), we have that
CSnPT −CSnSM >ΠWPT −ΠWSM >0 holds. Therefore, consumers
take advantage of arbitrage more than wholesalers.
Intuitively, this is because of the high arbitrage cost, which
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reduces wholesalers’ margin for arbitrage operations.
Conversely, in area (2), while consumers still benefit from
PT, wholesalers take the maximum advantage of arbitrage
operations, since the transport cost is sufficiently low.
It is worth noting that, in all areas in Figure 3, PT is
transferring profits from innovating firms (i.e., manufac‐
turers) to non-innovating firms (i.e., wholesalers). There‐
fore, in the long run, PT may have negative social effects,
when these are evaluated in terms of dynamic efficiency.
Actually, one should ascertain whether the manufacturers’
profit loss reflects into a reduction in R&D investment,
which in turn may cause a loss of competitiveness in the
relevant industry.
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5. Concluding remarks
PT has gained considerable importance in several indus‐
tries. It often stems from vertical relationships between
multinational manufacturing firms and international
wholesalers. We have analysed formally the practice of PT
through a game between a multinational and a wholesaler
operating in two markets. The wholesaler owns private
information about market sizes, and exploits this informa‐
tion advantage so as to practice international arbitrage. We
have shown that the scope for the wholesaler’s opportun‐
istic behaviour depends on the price differential between
countries, on the amount of resources employed in arbi‐
trage operations, and on the downstream market structure.
We have also shown that, depending on these factors, the
welfare implications of PT are ambiguous. We have
pointed out that one of the main effects of PT is transferring
profits from multinational manufacturing firms to interna‐
tional wholesalers. On the other hand, consumers as a
whole really benefit from PT only in the presence of a high
volume of parallel imports. This occurs when downstream
competition is not too intense, or transport costs are low.
If instead the volume of parallel imports is relatively small
(because transport costs are high), then market segmenta‐
tion with international price discrimination by the multi‐
national firm could be the socially optimal solution, as far
as downstream competition is sufficiently intense.
On the basis of the results obtained, we can draw a number
of recommendations for policy makers. The EU has
adopted a regime of regional exhaustion of IPR, which
allows free circulation of goods within Member States. This
policy choice is pursuant to the essential objective of
achieving the European single market. Both the European
Commission and the European Court of Justice have
repeatedly supported PT as a means to achieve the full
integration of national markets. Indeed, they believe that
PT strengthens competition in retail markets, thereby
inducing national retail prices to converge to a single price
across Europe. In principle, the mere threat of PT should
lead to global uniform pricing and thus eliminate any
arbitrage opportunities.
It is however worth noting that empirical evidence shows
that PT has gained large market shares, but has not yet
resulted in price convergence across relevant countries (see
e.g. [4]). Our vertical pricing model of PT attempts to
provide this evidence with a theoretical underpinning,
given that it exhibits both parallel imports and third-degree
retail price discrimination at equilibrium.
We have stressed that, when wholesalers and distributors
have private information on market demands, PT may even
have the perverse effect of increasing, rather than reducing,
cross-country differences in retail prices. It is therefore
important that upstream manufacturers are aware of
market demands. This condition could be achieved as long
as manufacturers are able (and allowed) to design effective
distribution monitoring schemes, or wholesalers are
subject to transparency obligations.
As to th  phar aceutical industry, which s the leadi g
example for this pape , the European C mmission has
noted that completion f the single ma ket in phar aceut‐
icals, to be achi ved through he fundamental support of
PT, should serve two main purposes [13]:
• to give patients access to the medicines they need at
affordable prices;
• to create incentives for innovation and industrial
development.
Later on, the Commission has argued that the availability
and affordability of medicines have a European dimension.
Thus, the Commission’s vision is to ensure that European
citizens can increasingly benefit from a competitive
industry that generates safe, innovative and accessible
medicines [14].
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Our results highlight that, in the short run, consumers do
not necessarily benefit when PT stems from privately
informed wholesalers and distributors. For instance, recent
empirical evidence has shown that there has been a
shortage of fundamental drugs in low-price EU countries,
which are the main sources of PT within the region.3 On the
basis of time series of market demand data, future empiri‐
cal work could thus attempt to determine in what measure
this phenomenon is due to manufacturers’ over-restrictions
in supply, or rather to an increased amount of arbitrage
operations. In the former case, shortage of medicines would
be caused by the manufacturers’ need to prevent the
potential risk of PT, while, in the latter case, it would be the
effect of parallel exports from low-price countries.
In the European pharmaceutical industry, the degree of
concentration in the downstream segment has been
increasing substantially in recent years. However, as long
as this trend towards concentration is not due to substantial
economies of scale in distribution, downstream competi‐
tion can be considered as an effective substitute for PT. The
rationale is that downstream competition may be able to
provide economic benefits to consumers and manufactur‐
ers, while avoiding the waste of resources associated with
arbitrage operations.
Moreover, under asymmetric information, policy makers
should be very cautious on the long run consequences of
PT in R&D intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals.
Given that PT is responsible for transferring profits from
innovating firms (namely, IPR owners) to non-innovating
firms (namely, international wholesalers), policy makers
should anticipate the possible consequences of PT on the
amount of R&D effort, which is essential to ensure that new
medicines continue to be introduced into the market.
The existing literature has provided mixed results on the
effects of PT on investment incentives. Some papers have
proved a stimulating effect of PT on investment [15, 16,
17], while other papers have shown that PT has an adverse
effect on R&D investment [18, 19]. All of these papers have
considered the case of complete information. In future
work, we could thus investigate the impact of PT on R&D
investment incentives, and, more generally, on social
welfare, in the case where PT takes place in an environment
of incomplete information.
Finally, future work could extend the analysis by introduc‐
ing either behavioral or structural regulation. In the former
case, national governments control (wholesale and/or
retail) prices, while, in the latter case, they may influence
the vertical structure of the supply chain, for example by
imposing or supporting either vertical integration or
vertical separation in the manufacturing-distribution chain
(see e.g. [20, 21]).
A further extension could be considering the presence of a
supra-national regulatory agency in the EU that, given the
regime of regional exhaustion of IPR, controls pricing
decisions in each Member State to improve global welfare
(see e.g. [22]). This issue is particularly relevant for the EU
pharmaceutical industry, where PT is allowed in a context
where pricing policies are still the prerogative of national
governments.
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